This is so funny!
If the Pentagon were a rectangle, I suppose that means we'd all be quoting "senior Rectangle officials," and the equally silly-sounding "Rectangle source." Imagine if the headline read: "Rectangle Readies for War."
Continue reading here.
If the Pentagon were a rectangle, I suppose that means we'd all be quoting "senior Rectangle officials," and the equally silly-sounding "Rectangle source." Imagine if the headline read: "Rectangle Readies for War."
Continue reading here.
- Mood:
amused
- Mood:
rushed
Clausewitz states that ‘War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will’ in the first chapter of the first book in On War. He adds that War is never an isolated act and does not consist of a single short blow. Also, in war, the result is never final. We need to remember also that the element of chance is always present in war. Clausewitz views also that ‘War is merely the continuation of policy by other means’ – to this he also suggests that all wars should be seen as branches from policy.
Colin Gray’s article also defines different types of strategic experience, that we should look at the commitment, scope and aim; scale; intensity and so on. This demonstrates Clausewitz point on war being a chameleon. Indeed as Earle has discussed using the Nazi war machine – War is Revolutionary. I also found it interesting that Germany saw what I believe is similar to the Kautilyan idea in the alliance to be formed – truly, war and the manner at which war is carried out can be across cultures as well.
Hanson in Carnage and Culture draws a stake distinction between the West and the East. He suggests that the Western way of war is much more lethal and that the world is getting more and more dangerous as states become more and more western. I do wonder, however, if warrior cultures are differentiated by geography and physiology instead. There are certainly a number of warrior tribes that are not necessarily Western but continue to have very lethal warrior cultures embedded in their society. I feel that in a way some of the Western cultures depends much more on technological advances to become a formidable adversary. Additionally I felt that he picked particular campaigns to illustrate his point – perhaps this would be what I might do as well, but I do think that it’s inevitably biased. He picked the Battle of Midway for example to illustrate his point. But the Pacific War had many instances when the Western ways have failed. Granted that the war was eventually won by the West, I think it’s not too fair to deny that other warrior cultures can be as dangerous, and as successful in waging wars as well. This however is just a thought, and would be interesting to talk about in class.
Colin Gray’s article also defines different types of strategic experience, that we should look at the commitment, scope and aim; scale; intensity and so on. This demonstrates Clausewitz point on war being a chameleon. Indeed as Earle has discussed using the Nazi war machine – War is Revolutionary. I also found it interesting that Germany saw what I believe is similar to the Kautilyan idea in the alliance to be formed – truly, war and the manner at which war is carried out can be across cultures as well.
Hanson in Carnage and Culture draws a stake distinction between the West and the East. He suggests that the Western way of war is much more lethal and that the world is getting more and more dangerous as states become more and more western. I do wonder, however, if warrior cultures are differentiated by geography and physiology instead. There are certainly a number of warrior tribes that are not necessarily Western but continue to have very lethal warrior cultures embedded in their society. I feel that in a way some of the Western cultures depends much more on technological advances to become a formidable adversary. Additionally I felt that he picked particular campaigns to illustrate his point – perhaps this would be what I might do as well, but I do think that it’s inevitably biased. He picked the Battle of Midway for example to illustrate his point. But the Pacific War had many instances when the Western ways have failed. Granted that the war was eventually won by the West, I think it’s not too fair to deny that other warrior cultures can be as dangerous, and as successful in waging wars as well. This however is just a thought, and would be interesting to talk about in class.
- Mood:
content
The landmark of Thucydides was an interesting read as it looks at how diplomacy was carried out amongst the Greek states during the Peloponnesian times. It seems that the two most powerful states – Athens and Sparta – are using their abilities to usurp more states under their control. I thought it was most interesting to see that it is of their interest to have a state subjugated, rather than have the Melos be a neutral friend to both Athens and Sparta.
In the Emergence of Great Powers, we see a slightly different behavior of states in which they are not only competing with each other for influence like Athens and Sparta, but also making alliances. This is in a way similar to what Athens had tried to do with Melos, but in another aspect is also different. Craig and George’s article looks at Louis XIV who maintained alliances with Swedes in the north and Turks in the south. Further links were maintained by marriages bound to the French court. And in the same way, this was a form of infiltration for the other states as well. I think in this aspect it is slightly different from the ‘friend’ or ‘enemy’ option that Melos had – when at that point of time, it is possible that only the state and its ruler mattered while in France, Louis XIV’s actions did more than that and every aspect of their people were influenced.
Jablonsky’s National Power, looking at what national power means, seems to me that there should be some considerations of his National and Social Determinants that natural determinants may now play a less important role to state power. This is however, in consideration that the state has enough developments in its social aspects that can bring give it enough national power internationally – in consideration of the changed global landscape.
Full Comments here
In the Emergence of Great Powers, we see a slightly different behavior of states in which they are not only competing with each other for influence like Athens and Sparta, but also making alliances. This is in a way similar to what Athens had tried to do with Melos, but in another aspect is also different. Craig and George’s article looks at Louis XIV who maintained alliances with Swedes in the north and Turks in the south. Further links were maintained by marriages bound to the French court. And in the same way, this was a form of infiltration for the other states as well. I think in this aspect it is slightly different from the ‘friend’ or ‘enemy’ option that Melos had – when at that point of time, it is possible that only the state and its ruler mattered while in France, Louis XIV’s actions did more than that and every aspect of their people were influenced.
Jablonsky’s National Power, looking at what national power means, seems to me that there should be some considerations of his National and Social Determinants that natural determinants may now play a less important role to state power. This is however, in consideration that the state has enough developments in its social aspects that can bring give it enough national power internationally – in consideration of the changed global landscape.
Full Comments here
- Mood:
okay
- Mood:
hot
Revision time...
This is prior to revision...
After having read Kliman’s Japan’s Security Strategy in the Post 9/11 World, I appreciated his attempt to highlight the inabilities of different schools of thought to explain what is happening in Japan in the recent years. He has also indicates that a new approach is needed to explain the recent Japanese security behavior.
In Berger’s article, he examines the domestic cultural-institutional context in which defense policy is made. He argues that ‘as a result of [Germany and Japan’s] historical experiences and the way in which those experiences were interpreted by domestic political actors, have developed beliefs and values that make them peculiarly reluctant to resort to the use of military force.’ (Pg. 318) Although he omits other affecting factors, such as leadership, he goes into detailed discussion about how cultural aspects and that both neorealism and neoliberalism are able to explain parts of Japanese military and security policy behaviors, and he too finds that international structures are underdetermining. I liked his take on explaining Japanese Political-military culture which he defined as a ‘larger political culture that influences how members of a given society view national security, the military as an institution, and the use of force in international relations.’ (326) Unlike national identity, Berger highlights that cultures are not static. This is because when events in the world happen, so do cognitive beliefs. This being so, it is highlighted that Japan had changed their political-military culture on occasions in history. I agree with Berger’s view that even with the shifts that has happened, they shifts were consistent with the antimilitary policies that had been established since the 1950s. As well as the view that in order for Japan to have a drastic change, it would have to take the entire pull-out of the US military forces in the region. Although the US is pulling out forces from Okinawa, their relationship with Japan is still very strong.
With these views, it is in my perception that Japan’s recent actions (of increasing desire to normalize, of increasing participation of the JDF in international PKOs and so on) do not necessary mean that Japan is becoming a militaristic nation. Japan’s economical and technological strength is still important in the region despite the growth of China and India. Japan can also contribute to the security of the SLOCs that run through the region as well and their technology is something that many other states in the region cannot be on par with. In the recent APSF held in Cebu, it has been indicated that Japan is keen on contributing to various aspects of security in the region. However, the historical baggage of Japanese atrocities in WWII have not allowed for the country to behave like a normal one. This is indeed an unfortunate situation, seeing what Japan may be able to contribute, and perhaps is the exact explanation for the schools of thought cannot explain Japanese military behavior.
This is prior to revision...
After having read Kliman’s Japan’s Security Strategy in the Post 9/11 World, I appreciated his attempt to highlight the inabilities of different schools of thought to explain what is happening in Japan in the recent years. He has also indicates that a new approach is needed to explain the recent Japanese security behavior.
In Berger’s article, he examines the domestic cultural-institutional context in which defense policy is made. He argues that ‘as a result of [Germany and Japan’s] historical experiences and the way in which those experiences were interpreted by domestic political actors, have developed beliefs and values that make them peculiarly reluctant to resort to the use of military force.’ (Pg. 318) Although he omits other affecting factors, such as leadership, he goes into detailed discussion about how cultural aspects and that both neorealism and neoliberalism are able to explain parts of Japanese military and security policy behaviors, and he too finds that international structures are underdetermining. I liked his take on explaining Japanese Political-military culture which he defined as a ‘larger political culture that influences how members of a given society view national security, the military as an institution, and the use of force in international relations.’ (326) Unlike national identity, Berger highlights that cultures are not static. This is because when events in the world happen, so do cognitive beliefs. This being so, it is highlighted that Japan had changed their political-military culture on occasions in history. I agree with Berger’s view that even with the shifts that has happened, they shifts were consistent with the antimilitary policies that had been established since the 1950s. As well as the view that in order for Japan to have a drastic change, it would have to take the entire pull-out of the US military forces in the region. Although the US is pulling out forces from Okinawa, their relationship with Japan is still very strong.
With these views, it is in my perception that Japan’s recent actions (of increasing desire to normalize, of increasing participation of the JDF in international PKOs and so on) do not necessary mean that Japan is becoming a militaristic nation. Japan’s economical and technological strength is still important in the region despite the growth of China and India. Japan can also contribute to the security of the SLOCs that run through the region as well and their technology is something that many other states in the region cannot be on par with. In the recent APSF held in Cebu, it has been indicated that Japan is keen on contributing to various aspects of security in the region. However, the historical baggage of Japanese atrocities in WWII have not allowed for the country to behave like a normal one. This is indeed an unfortunate situation, seeing what Japan may be able to contribute, and perhaps is the exact explanation for the schools of thought cannot explain Japanese military behavior.
First, I have to define Globalisation and indicate what the implications are of the definition in relation to the concept of the State and of Security.
And then i have to think up a future scenario for the world of 2017. I have to list down who or what are the major actors; what are the principal issues dominating global politics; what is the state of international security?
hmm......
And then i have to think up a future scenario for the world of 2017. I have to list down who or what are the major actors; what are the principal issues dominating global politics; what is the state of international security?
hmm......
- Mood:
anxious
This has got to be the most brainless report ever. No effort whatsoever and just a copy and paste from the just-completed term paper.
what to do... Ayu is tired and exhausted and it's about time she rests...
here it is anyways (the last report for the Japanese FP class)
Geographically, Japan is in a manner insulated from both the Chinese and Western Civilization and has developed a unique one of their own. Japan is an industrialized nation both modern, and distinctively Asian at the same time. Yet, while this seems to be an amalgam of both, Japan is at times unable to come to terms with this fusion. Throughout history, Japan has been positioning itself towards the west, the east, or simply within itself, in order to maintain the best footing in the international realm. During the Tokugawa period, Japan was in isolationism as the shogunate thought that they had to fight off the foreigners. Alternatively, during the Meiji, the reformers felt that in order to achieve Fukoku Kyohei, they had to learn from the West. And this they maintained under the concept of Wakon Yosai (Japanese spirit, Western Technology) These different positions Japan took for itself definitely benefited the country in many ways. Yet, it also poses as a problem, for Japan does not seem to be truly Asian or Western.
While Ito has argued that ‘Japan's only way out of this dilemma is to enhance its own strength, requiring Japan to confirm its own unique identity independent of the West (the US) and the East (China) and to establish a national objective on that foundation’ , Nishio adds that ‘In the more distant past Japan measured itself against the model of civilization offered by mainland China, and has from the Meiji Period adopted Western civilization as the standard against which to measure the speed of its modern progress. … Japanese have begun to realize the invalidity of this approach.’ However, being neither here nor there can be a problem in this globalized world. This is because one needs to build more mutual trust and bonds, as well as maintain these friendships and ties, in order to best benefit and survive.
Additionally, Japan’s security policy is both flexible and rigid because of this. As Katzenstein and Okawara have indicated, Japan is often more flexible on economic security issues than on military security issues. Perhaps this is also due to historical memory, that Japan is more enabled to work for the economy than for military issues. Also, the globalized economy means that if Japan, the world’s second largest economy has a problem, the others in the region and beyond would also be badly affected. In contrast, military issues are more difficult to pursue because the concept of traditional sovereignty comes into play. This reminds the neighbors of Japanese war atrocities and could pose as a problem for Japan. Perhaps this is the reason behind the two contrasting natures of Japanese policies.
Finally, perhaps Bessho is correct in saying that Japan is only in Asia and not really part of Asia. Although ‘Japan has been sympathetic to the special concern of the Southeast Asian countries over state sovereignty’ , Japan does have an identity gap with ASEAN as ASEAN basically built itself upon the ASEAN way of diplomacy. This gap may be problematic for cooperation.
what to do... Ayu is tired and exhausted and it's about time she rests...
here it is anyways (the last report for the Japanese FP class)
Geographically, Japan is in a manner insulated from both the Chinese and Western Civilization and has developed a unique one of their own. Japan is an industrialized nation both modern, and distinctively Asian at the same time. Yet, while this seems to be an amalgam of both, Japan is at times unable to come to terms with this fusion. Throughout history, Japan has been positioning itself towards the west, the east, or simply within itself, in order to maintain the best footing in the international realm. During the Tokugawa period, Japan was in isolationism as the shogunate thought that they had to fight off the foreigners. Alternatively, during the Meiji, the reformers felt that in order to achieve Fukoku Kyohei, they had to learn from the West. And this they maintained under the concept of Wakon Yosai (Japanese spirit, Western Technology) These different positions Japan took for itself definitely benefited the country in many ways. Yet, it also poses as a problem, for Japan does not seem to be truly Asian or Western.
While Ito has argued that ‘Japan's only way out of this dilemma is to enhance its own strength, requiring Japan to confirm its own unique identity independent of the West (the US) and the East (China) and to establish a national objective on that foundation’ , Nishio adds that ‘In the more distant past Japan measured itself against the model of civilization offered by mainland China, and has from the Meiji Period adopted Western civilization as the standard against which to measure the speed of its modern progress. … Japanese have begun to realize the invalidity of this approach.’ However, being neither here nor there can be a problem in this globalized world. This is because one needs to build more mutual trust and bonds, as well as maintain these friendships and ties, in order to best benefit and survive.
Additionally, Japan’s security policy is both flexible and rigid because of this. As Katzenstein and Okawara have indicated, Japan is often more flexible on economic security issues than on military security issues. Perhaps this is also due to historical memory, that Japan is more enabled to work for the economy than for military issues. Also, the globalized economy means that if Japan, the world’s second largest economy has a problem, the others in the region and beyond would also be badly affected. In contrast, military issues are more difficult to pursue because the concept of traditional sovereignty comes into play. This reminds the neighbors of Japanese war atrocities and could pose as a problem for Japan. Perhaps this is the reason behind the two contrasting natures of Japanese policies.
Finally, perhaps Bessho is correct in saying that Japan is only in Asia and not really part of Asia. Although ‘Japan has been sympathetic to the special concern of the Southeast Asian countries over state sovereignty’ , Japan does have an identity gap with ASEAN as ASEAN basically built itself upon the ASEAN way of diplomacy. This gap may be problematic for cooperation.
- Mood: exhausted
This paper seeks to address the issue of globalization in relation to the spread of nuclear armaments as a state. Globalization is seen to be slowly disintegrating the importance of national borders and often argued as under-mining the state. Transportation and information travel at a much faster rate, thereby contributing to the increased spread of nuclear arms technology around the globe. Additionally, globalization seems to also be heightening the importance of national identity and states may seek to preserve it. This may result in a more pronounced security policy by states that may feel side-lined in the international community.
- Mood:
working
There hasn't been much to update because I haven't been doing much but I do have some papers to complete~~~ (what an incredible excuse)
On the shelves are:
Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights by Douglas A. Macgregor
Lifting the Fog of War by Admiral Bill Owens
Defense Strategy for the Post-Saddam Era by Michael E. O'Hanlon
In the meantime I have to finish my methods paper and come up with some theory... and then think about the skeleton for the WMD paper for another class.
Sigh.
On the shelves are:
Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights by Douglas A. Macgregor
Lifting the Fog of War by Admiral Bill Owens
Defense Strategy for the Post-Saddam Era by Michael E. O'Hanlon
In the meantime I have to finish my methods paper and come up with some theory... and then think about the skeleton for the WMD paper for another class.
Sigh.
- Mood: tired
So how do i measure transparency?
Opaque
Translucent
Transparent?
Sigh!
Opaque
Translucent
Transparent?
Sigh!
- Mood:
confused
I found the discussion in class very interesting as well as informative even as one of the presenters this week. Being able to understand the hard sciences a little better with layman terms definitely enhances my conceptualization of ideas with regards to this topic. The class has thought about why there aren’t more nuclear states if the NPT has failed. I think we should also spend some time thinking about what would happen if there had been no NPT at all. I believe the NPT has paved the way for a nonproliferation norm in the international community. This could perhaps be the reasons why most states fear being isolated if they turn to nuclear arms. Instead of pointing out what is lacking in the NPT, I feel therefore that it is still useful to look at what positive things it has done for the nonproliferation regime. As with all other forms of technology and knowledge, nuclear technology has arrived, and will be here to stay.
Although the emphasis of my presentation was not on CBR WMD threat, I think it is still an important issue as these are much more affordable for bodies to acquire them. As we can see from the Sarin gas attacks by Aum Shinrikyo at the Tokyo Subway, the materials used to contain them are primitive. States should still actively continue research into CBR threat prevention, or at least look into preparing the citizens for possible CBR attacks. Efficient management during a crisis, I feel, is the most important aspect of defense. If the soft targets are hardened, possible attacks will be less affective.
Although the emphasis of my presentation was not on CBR WMD threat, I think it is still an important issue as these are much more affordable for bodies to acquire them. As we can see from the Sarin gas attacks by Aum Shinrikyo at the Tokyo Subway, the materials used to contain them are primitive. States should still actively continue research into CBR threat prevention, or at least look into preparing the citizens for possible CBR attacks. Efficient management during a crisis, I feel, is the most important aspect of defense. If the soft targets are hardened, possible attacks will be less affective.
I think it's sketchy. This class was on decision making models and I've got so much other stuff to do that this is really not up to par. :S
The readings have given me great insight into understanding the decision-making processes that could have taken place in Japan, in different situations. It seems that Japanese Foreign Policy is closest to the rational, bureaucratic and pluralistic models, not in any particular order. Of personal opinion, there seems to be indication that there is no single model that applies to a decision-making on foreign policy in general. After the Taepodong-1 testing in 1998, it has been made clear that Japan will cooperated with the US and impose further economic sanctions on Pyongyang should there be another test. This is regardless of whether they have attained a sanctions resolution of the UNSC. Indeed, taking the recent testing of the Taepodong-2 by North Korea, Japan immediately responded by imposing additional restrictions on the movement of goods and people between Japan and the DPRK. Within hours, Japan has reacted by banning the docking of the Mangyongbyon-92, a ferry that shuttles between Wonson in North Korea and Niigata, and which is the main direct link between the two countries. It is also important to note that a previous testing in 1998 of Taepodong-1 resulted in parts of the missile flying over Japanese airspace and the recent Taepodong-2 testing has resulted in its crashing into the Sea of Japan. The intention of this decision was therefore to send a clear signal to North Korea that if it chooses to continue its programs of WMD and their delivery, they will be further isolated politically and economically. (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/7
These responses from Japan definitely show that the rational model is being utilized, and that pluralist model seems to be sidelined. The anti-militarists pressure seem to be diminished in this particular issue. However, we should also bear in mind that since Koizumi’s term as Prime Minister, the JDF also appears to be on a path to normalization. The Japanese defense posture is much closer to the US especially after 911.
The above is just a single case study and depending on the situation, the time period, and the leadership, it could be possible that different decision making models are used than another. Koizumi’s popularity with the Japanese population are phenomenal; the decisions made could be different if Abe was the Prime Minister instead.
The readings have given me great insight into understanding the decision-making processes that could have taken place in Japan, in different situations. It seems that Japanese Foreign Policy is closest to the rational, bureaucratic and pluralistic models, not in any particular order. Of personal opinion, there seems to be indication that there is no single model that applies to a decision-making on foreign policy in general. After the Taepodong-1 testing in 1998, it has been made clear that Japan will cooperated with the US and impose further economic sanctions on Pyongyang should there be another test. This is regardless of whether they have attained a sanctions resolution of the UNSC. Indeed, taking the recent testing of the Taepodong-2 by North Korea, Japan immediately responded by imposing additional restrictions on the movement of goods and people between Japan and the DPRK. Within hours, Japan has reacted by banning the docking of the Mangyongbyon-92, a ferry that shuttles between Wonson in North Korea and Niigata, and which is the main direct link between the two countries. It is also important to note that a previous testing in 1998 of Taepodong-1 resulted in parts of the missile flying over Japanese airspace and the recent Taepodong-2 testing has resulted in its crashing into the Sea of Japan. The intention of this decision was therefore to send a clear signal to North Korea that if it chooses to continue its programs of WMD and their delivery, they will be further isolated politically and economically. (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/7
These responses from Japan definitely show that the rational model is being utilized, and that pluralist model seems to be sidelined. The anti-militarists pressure seem to be diminished in this particular issue. However, we should also bear in mind that since Koizumi’s term as Prime Minister, the JDF also appears to be on a path to normalization. The Japanese defense posture is much closer to the US especially after 911.
The above is just a single case study and depending on the situation, the time period, and the leadership, it could be possible that different decision making models are used than another. Koizumi’s popularity with the Japanese population are phenomenal; the decisions made could be different if Abe was the Prime Minister instead.
- Location:living room
- Mood: listless
This is an article in the collection of writings entitled Clausewitz and Modern Strategy. Random thoughts have followed.
Clausewitz's intelligence is all about gauging from information, this I perceive as a role 'passion' in war plays. Is modern technology therefore able to remove the 'passion' and make information more accurate?
Kahn observes Clausewitz's ideas on chance affecting intelligence, and points out that Clausewitz sees chance as the one factor reducing accuracy and predictive value in information. This occurs due to the following reasons:
1. Armies have become too big, and thus it is difficult to determine ability
2. Change in tactics had resulted in position of enemy harder to determine
3. Troops are limited by range of vision
4. The enemy can still keep at least some of his secrets, and they might only be known when it’s all too late.
5. Dominance of perception over fact, thus affecting decision made.
New information technology seems to tackle the second and third points. I’m questioning the possibility of acquiring vital information earlier, to improve one’s intelligence. Isn’t this what new technology is supposed to promise? Additionally, it is also useful to note that while armies may be smaller today, is it still difficult to determine ability?
So… Clausewitz has viewed intelligence with skepticism… Even when I believe that the Fog of War will continue to exist, I think wouldn’t see intelligence with disdain. Intelligence may fail, but intelligence also gives one the ability to judge and thus, decide.
Clausewitz's intelligence is all about gauging from information, this I perceive as a role 'passion' in war plays. Is modern technology therefore able to remove the 'passion' and make information more accurate?
Kahn observes Clausewitz's ideas on chance affecting intelligence, and points out that Clausewitz sees chance as the one factor reducing accuracy and predictive value in information. This occurs due to the following reasons:
1. Armies have become too big, and thus it is difficult to determine ability
2. Change in tactics had resulted in position of enemy harder to determine
3. Troops are limited by range of vision
4. The enemy can still keep at least some of his secrets, and they might only be known when it’s all too late.
5. Dominance of perception over fact, thus affecting decision made.
New information technology seems to tackle the second and third points. I’m questioning the possibility of acquiring vital information earlier, to improve one’s intelligence. Isn’t this what new technology is supposed to promise? Additionally, it is also useful to note that while armies may be smaller today, is it still difficult to determine ability?
So… Clausewitz has viewed intelligence with skepticism… Even when I believe that the Fog of War will continue to exist, I think wouldn’t see intelligence with disdain. Intelligence may fail, but intelligence also gives one the ability to judge and thus, decide.
- Location:living room
- Mood:
thoughtful
I just thought it's about time i have something dedicated to the things i'm reading for work, basically. So i've set this up other than my main page.
I guess this page is just to keep me sane and hopefully, if there's anyone out there who cares... it would be useful to hear from you.
Up on my shelves now are Keegan's intelligence in war and Clausewitz and modern strategy edited by Handel.
I'd love to start on them right now but have an essay to do. So it has to wait till tomorrow maybe.
so little time so much to do :(
I guess this page is just to keep me sane and hopefully, if there's anyone out there who cares... it would be useful to hear from you.
Up on my shelves now are Keegan's intelligence in war and Clausewitz and modern strategy edited by Handel.
I'd love to start on them right now but have an essay to do. So it has to wait till tomorrow maybe.
so little time so much to do :(
- Location:living room
- Mood: tired
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